App-1 Are You a Rational Person? Check Yourself-App-1-4

This document contains Appendix 1 to 4 Appendix 1 Are You a Rational Person? Check Yourself Lecture Outline why is it important to be rational? Advantages for the negotiator Pie expansion and pie-slicing Learning and personal growth (rational models do not allow for rationalization or justification of behavior) Measure of perfection Diagnosis Dealing with irrational people Consistency Decision making individual decision making Riskless choice Approach-approach conflict Multiattribute utility technique (MAUT) Identification of alternatives Identification of attributes Utility Weight Making a decision (Exhibit A1-1); dominance principle Decision-making under uncertainty Risky choice (Exhibit A1-2) Expected utility theory (EU) Utility function Comparability Closure Transitivity property Reducibility and the compound gamble Substitutability Betweenness Continuity or solvability Expected value principle and the law of large numbers Risk attitudes Risk neutral or risk indifferent Risk averse Risk seeking Expected utility principle St. Petersburg paradox Diminishing marginal utility (Exhibit A1-3) Risk taking (Exhibit A1-4) Certainty effect (Exhibit A1-5) Decision weights (Exhibit A1-6) Extremity effect Crossover probability Subadditivity Subcertainty Regressiveness principle Generic prospect theory value function (Exhibit A1-7) Combination rules Summing up: Individual decision making Decisions may be faulty or irrational if probabilities are not carefully considered Clever negotiators are aware of their own decision biases, as well as how the decisions of others are manipulated to their own advantage game theoretic rationality Each outcome in a negotiation may be identified in terms of its utility for each party (Exhibit A1-8); payoffs represent satisfaction derived from particular commodities or outcomes Two key issues concerning rationality at the negotiation table People should not agree to a utility payoff smaller than their reservation point Negotiators should not agree to an outcome if another outcome exists that is pareto-superior Nash bargaining theory Nash solution: specific point prediction of negotiated outcome Uniqueness Pareto-optimality (Exhibit A1-9) Symmetry Independence of equivalent utility representations Independence of irrelevant alternatives Key Terms approach-approach conflict A type of intrapersonal conflict in which we are attracted to two (or more) options, but may choose only one. betweenness axiom An axiom stating that if x is preferred to y, then x must be preferred to any probability mixture of x and y, which in turn must be preferred to y. certainty effect A principle stating that people overweight guaranteed outcomes relative to outcomes that are merely probable. compound gamble Gambles in which the outcomes themselves are gambles, rather than pure outcomes. concave function Situation in which a person’s utility for money decreases marginally; additional monetary gains bring smaller increases in satisfaction. continuity axiom In utility theory, an axiom stating that for any set of outcomes, a decision maker should always prefer a gamble between the best and worst outcome to a sure intermediate outcome, if the odds of the best outcome are good enough. crossover probability The point at which subjective weights are exactly identical to objective probability. diminishing marginal utility The tendency for increasing units of a resource (e.g., money) to result in decreasing levels of satisfaction. dominance principle A principle stating that one alternative dominates another if it is just as good on all pertinent aspect dimensions and better on at least one. expected utility theory (EU) The amount of satisfaction of the potential outcomes of a prospect, each weighted by its probability. expected-value principle A principle stating that the expected value of a prospect is the sum of the objective values of the outcomes multiplied by the probability of their occurrence. extremity effect The tendency to overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities. independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom An axiom stating that the best outcome in a feasible set of outcomes will also be the best outcome in any smaller subset of feasible outcomes that still contains that outcome. indeterminacy The inability to predict negotiation outcomes. law of large numbers A principle stating that the mean return will get closer and closer to its expected value the more times a gamble is repeated. multiattribute utility technique (MAUT) A method of analyzing decision situations, involving four main tasks: (1) identifying the alternatives; (2) identifying dimensions or attributes of the alternatives; (3) evaluating the utility associated with each dimension; and (4) weighting or prioritizing each dimension in terms of importance. Nash solution A solution that postulates that the agreement point of a negotiation will satisfy the following five axioms: uniqueness, pareto-optimality, symmetry, independence of equivalent utility representations, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. pareto-efficient frontier The set of outcomes corresponding to the entire set of agreements that leaves no portion of the total amount of resources unallocated. reducibility axiom An axiom stating that if two risky alternatives include identical and equally probable outcomes among their possible consequences, then the utility of these outcomes should be ignored in choosing between these two options. regressiveness principle A principle in which extreme values of some quantity do not deviate very much from the average value of that quantity. risk attitude A person’s preferences concerning outcomes that are gambles or sure things of equal expected value. risk-averse Preference for a sure thing rather than a gamble. risk-neutral or risk-indifferent Indifference between a gamble and sure outcome of equal expected value. risk-seeking Preference for a gamble rather than a sure thing. St. Petersburg paradox The observed reluctance to play a game of chance, despite its infinite expected value. subcertainty In prospect theory, the observation that people’s subjective weightings for mutually exclusive and exhaustive events do not sum to 1. substitutability axiom An axiom stating that gambles that have outcomes about which people are indifferent are interchangeable. symmetric bargaining When two players have exactly the same strategic possibilities and bargaining power and, therefore, neither player has any reason to accept an agreement that yields a lower payoff than that of the opponent. transitivity property A property stating that if a person prefers option x to option y, and option y to option z, then he or she should prefer x to z. uniqueness axiom An axiom stating that there is a unique solution to each bargaining situation or game. utility function The quantification of a person’s preferences, with respect to certain objects. Suggested Exercises and other materials EXERCISE: The Best Stuff on Earth by Holly Schroth, Damien Dirringer, John Hudson, Nadir Hussain, Michael McLaren, Kim Roseman, and James Slipe This is a multiparty, multi-issue negotiation intended to simulate the negotiations that occur in top management teams. The exercise is based on the buyout of Snapple Beverages by Quaker Oats. Preparation: 25-30 min. Negotiation: 90-120 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: Commodities Brokers by Leigh Thompson and Leaf Van Boven This is a set of three negotiations between two brokers. It is a multiple-time-period, two-party, integ¬ra¬tive negotiation between two brokers trading four commodities, in which there is risk involved. Part¬ic¬ipants are randomly assigned to the role of Broker Jones or Broker Smith in the trading of various quantities and grades of wheat, rice, copper, and crude oil. This is an excellent negotiation for illustrating the impact of risk and uncertainty on behavior and performance over time. Pre¬pa¬ra-tion: 15 min. Negotiation: 30 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: The Diamond Bidding Game by J. Keith Murnighan This is an asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma game for two individuals or two parties. It is an excellent example of how unequal payoff distributions, when known, can throw a wrench into potentially cooperative relations. This builds nicely off The Gas Station Game (see below). Preparation: 10 min. Negotiation: 45 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: The Everyone Has a Number Market by J. Keith Murnighan This market exercise is for medium or large groups (i.e., 16 or more). Participants all receive private information that determines the kinds of strategies that are beneficial to them within the market, where they must negotiate dyadically, but can move from one potential partner to another. The exercise moves from market interactions, to debriefings, to additional market interactions and debriefings. Issues raised include the value of information and the importance of nonverbal cues. Preparation: 5 min. Negotiation: 10-15 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: The Game of Envelopes and Money by J. Keith Murnighan This is a large-group social dilemma game where the parties can win or, more likely, lose real money. Based on an exercise described by Dave Messick and Christel Rutte (1992), it shows how difficult cooperation is for large groups of people who cannot interact to boost commitment. Time: Takes 5 min. to play and additional time to tabulate results. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: The Game of 4-3-2 by J. Keith Murnighan This is a three-party coalition game, with three variations. It shows how subtle changes in the structure of the situation have marked impacts on the negotiation process. Discussion highlights the strategies to be considered in choosing between individually beneficial two-party agreements and collectively beneficial three-party agreements. Time: three 25-min. rounds. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: The Gas Station Game by J. Keith Murnighan This is a Prisoner’s Dilemma game for two individuals or two parties. It revolves around repeated price-setting choices by the owners of two gasoline stations. It moves from no communication, to communication, to a known endpoint looming in the near future. The case shows the conflicts people have when making basic cooperative or noncooperative choices and raises issues of trust, intergroup, and intragroup coordination. Preparation: 10 min. Negotiation: 30-40 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: The Highest Number Game by J. Keith Murnighan This is a short group exercise that shows negotiating strategies can rarely maximize all possible outcomes, and that low-probability–high-outcome events should not be expected. No preparation necessary. Exercise: 5-10 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: The Ultimatum Game by J. Keith Murnighan This is a market exercise for medium or large-groups that is played twice, with discussion about issues of fairness, the use of strategic power, equ¬a¬li¬ty, and justice between, and after the two rounds. One party is given information and power; the other party must deal with a po¬s¬ition of relative weakness. Preparation: 5-10 min. Negotiation: 10 min. each. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leve¬rone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. FILM: A Beautiful Mind (2001) Directed by Ron Howard An award-winning biopic of the meteoric rise of John Forbes Nash, Jr. (played by Russell Crowe), a math prodigy able to solve problems that baffled the greatest of minds. It is the story of how he overcame years of suffering through schizophrenia to win the Nobel Prize. The scene in the bar is a great illustration of Nash’s development of game theory, as well as an example of tacit cooperation in social dilemmas. Running time: 135 min. Released by Universal Studios; available from www.amazon.com and other on-line outlets. Appendix 2 Nonverbal Communication and Lie Detection Lecture Outline what are we looking for in nonverbal communication? Nonverbal communication: anything that is “not words” Vocal cues or paralinguistic cues Facial expressions Eye contact Interpersonal spacing Posture Body movements Gesture Emblems Illustrators Adaptors Touching Nonverbal communication is informative because it is relatively irrepressible (not under our control) What particular nonverbal behaviors lead negotiators to distrust people? (Exhibit A2-1) nonverbal communication and the corporate world Are women more nonverbally gifted than men? Women are more skilled in nonverbal expression In terms of nonverbal reception, women are no more skilled than men at recognizing covert messages Anyone inferior in status is more sensitive to the states of mind of their superiors (but are not more sensitive to deception) Dominance People assert dominance and power through nonverbal cues High social power is reliably indicated by patterns of looking while speaking and listening Men behave visually as if they are more powerful when they have equal (or more) power; women “look” like more powerful people when they have more power Personal charisma Social skill related to verbal and nonverbal expressiveness Expressiveness (“spontaneous sending”) is immediately influential The most interpersonally successful communicators are nonverbally sensitive, nonverbally expressive, nonverbally self-controlled, and motivated to perform for their “audiences” detecting deception (Exhibit A2-2) Direct methods Triangulation Objective evidence Linguistic style Indirect methods Enrich the mode of communication Do not rely on a person’s face Tone of voice Microexpressions Interchannel discrepancies (illustrators) Eye contact Be aware of egocentric biases How motivation and temptation affects lying and deception Deception and secrecy can create a life of its own Key Terms charisma A social skill having to do with verbal and nonverbal expressiveness. microexpressions Expressions on a person’s face that show for a very short amount of time (about one-tenth of a second), and reveal how a person is truly feeling. nonverbal expression The way in which people express themselves through nonverbal communication (e.g., gestures, vocal cues, facial expressions, posture, eye contact, touching, interpersonal spacing, or body movement). nonverbal reception The way in which people receive and recognize nonverbal communication and cues from a sender. triangulation A method by which a person uses several approaches to arrive at an accurate judgment. Suggested Exercises and other materials EXERCISE: Commodity Purchase by Leonard Greenhalgh This simulation is best run with six participants in each group, but can be run with fewer. It involves a seller who has 100,000 pheasant eggs and up to five buyers who need the eggs for very different purposes. If the eggs are simply auctioned to the highest bidder, the seller achieves a suboptimal outcome. Combinations of buyers can pool their purchasing power and instead of competing, collaborate to share the produce. Preparation: 15 min. Negotiation: 30-45 min. Available from Creative Consensus, Inc., P.O. Box 5054, Hanover, NH 03755. Phone/fax: (603) 643-0331. EXERCISE: The Everyone Has A Number Market by J. Keith Murnighan This market exercise is for medium or large groups (i.e., 16 or more). Participants all receive private information that determines the kinds of strategies that are beneficial to them within the market, where they must negotiate dyadically, but can move from one potential partner to another. The exercise moves from market interactions, to debriefings, to additional market interactions and debriefings. Issues raised include the value of information and the importance of nonverbal cues. Preparation: 5 min. Negotiation: 10-15 min. each. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: The Performance Interview by Leonard Greenhalgh This two-party simulation involves an interaction between a boss and a subordinate. The simulation evokes participants’ normal styles of dealing with an interpersonal problem: whether to directly or indirectly address the problem, or avoid dealing with it. Preparation: 30 min. Meeting: 30 min. Available from Creative Consensus, Inc., P.O. Box 5054, Hanover, NH 03755. Phone/fax: (603) 643-0331. EXERCISE: Salary Negotiation by Holly Schroth, Gina Ney, Michael Roedter, Adi Rosen, and Michael Tiedman This is a qualitative, two-party salary negotiation that can be used to teach packaging issues, strategic use of compatible issues, and use of objective criteria. Preparation: 10-20 min. Negotiation: 30-40 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. Appendix 3 Third-Party Intervention Lecture Outline Common third party roles Mediation Arbitration Traditional arbitration Final-offer arbitration Mediation-arbitration (med-arb) Arbitration-mediation (arb-med) key choice points in third-party interventions Outcome versus process control Formal versus informal Invited versus uninvited Interpersonal versus intergroup Content versus process orientation Facilitation, formulation, or manipulation Disputant preferences Mediators and gender Challenges facing third parties Meeting disputant’s expectations Increasing the likelihood that parties reach an agreement if a positive bargaining zone exists Promoting a pareto-efficient outcome Promoting outcomes that are perceived as fair in the eyes of disputants Improving the relationship between parties Empowering parties in the negotiation process Debiasing negotiators Exaggeration of conflict bias Hostile media bias Overconfidence bias Maintaining neutrality Strategies for enhancing effectiveness in third-party intervention Accept your share of responsibility Test your own position Role-play a third party in your own dispute Training in win-win negotiation Suggested Exercises and other materials EXERCISE: Amanda by Jeanne M. Brett and Rekha Karambayya This is a manger-as-a-third-party exercise. There is a dispute between two managers and a third manager becomes involved as a dispute resolver. There are two versions of the case: In one version, the third-party manager is a peer of the disputants; in the other, the third-party manager is their boss. Preparation: 30 min. Negotiation: 45 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: The Drug-Testing Program by Leonard Greenhalgh This three-party exercise involves a personnel manager, an employee assistance program coordinator, and an MBA-trained employee who has tested positive for marijuana. The exercise introduces issues of coalition formation, responsibility to the corporation, precedent, evidence, and corporate policies. Preparation: 40 min. Exercise: 30 min. Available from Creative Consensus, Inc., P.O. Box 5054, Hanover, NH 03755. Phone/fax: (603) 643-0331. EXERCISE: Gold Card by Jeanne M. Brett Gold Card is a three-party dispute resolution exercise. The dispute is between a bank and a financial serv¬ices firm over aspects of their joint venture to provide a special feature credit card to the fin¬an¬ci¬al services firm's upscale clientele. When representatives of the two institutions cannot reach agree¬ment about implementation, they call in the financial services firm's manager who negotiated the origi¬¬nal venture. Preparation: 20 min. Negotiation: 45 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: Lending Limit by Jeanne M. Brett An account manager for a bank and the bank’s manager for its South African branch are disputing about whether a client should be given a loan to build a plant in South Africa. The third party is the managers’ mutual boss, the executive vice president for commercial lending. Teaching notes for Amanda (see above) may be used with this exercise. Preparation: 15 min. Negotiation: 45 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: Santara vs. Kessel by Stephen B. Goldberg A third-party mediator is at the table trying to facilitate a dispute that has reached an impasse. Prepa¬ra¬tion: 30 min. Negotiation: 60 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: Southern Electric by Stephen B. Goldberg This is a mediation of a labor grievance. The grievant has been discharged following three “preventable” accidents. The company has a rule that requires discharging any employee who, in the course of operating company vehicles, is involved in three preventable accidents in a three-year period. The use of information is an interesting issue in this case. Preparation: 30 min. Negotiation: 60 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: Squabbling Authors by Katheryn M. Dutenhaver Squabbling Authors can be used as a mediation exercise, or it can be used to demonstrate the differences between mediation and arbitration. Two anthropologists have finished a book manuscript and are having trouble deciding whose name should go first. Preparation: 5 min. Arbitration: 10-15 min. Mediation: 15-20 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: Telepro by Holly Schroth and Gary Riding This is a dispute between a supervisor and an employee in which a third party, the supervisor’s manager becomes involved. The case can be used to teach mediation in the management context. It also illustrates how power and status differences between parties can be managed in a mediated con¬text. Preparation: 15-20 min. Negotiation: 70 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. Appendix 4 Negotiating a Job Offer Lecture Outline preparation Figure out what you really want Checklist of “needs” and “wants” (Exhibit A4-1) Practical, step-by-step approach to compensation and benefits (Exhibit A4-2) Do your homework Research the company and the industry Web information is valuable, but is only a starting point Determine your BATNA and your aspiration point Research the employer’s BATNA Determine the issue mix Prepare several scenarios If the employer agrees immediately to your counter offer If the employer makes a low-ball offer and states, “This is our final offer” If the employer makes one small concession If the employer asks you to make a reasonable offer Consider getting a “coach” in vivo: during the negotiation itself Think about the best way to position and present your opening offer Assume that the offer is negotiable Immediately reanchor the interviewer by reviewing your needs and your rationale Reveal neither your BATNA nor your reservation point Rehearse and practice Imagine that you are negotiating on behalf of someone else (not just yourself) Comparables and benchmarks postoffer: you have the offer, now what? Don’t immediately agree to the offer Get the offer in writing Be enthusiastic and gracious Assess the interviewer’s power to negotiate with you State exactly what needs to be done for you to agree Don’t negotiate if you are not or could not be interested Exploding offers Do not try to create a bidding war Know when to stop pushing The other side is not responsive Reciprocal concessions are becoming miniscule After some back and forth, they say “enough!” Use a rational strategy for choosing among job offers Multiattribute utility approach (MAUT) Suggested Exercises and other materials EXERCISE: Computron Pharmaceuticals by Leigh Thompson, Victoria Medvec, Wendi Adair, Peter Kim, Kathleen O’Connor, and Janice Nadler This is a two-party negotiation requiring multiple skills to reach fully integrative agreements. Parties include a potential hiree and hiring officer for a pharmaceutical engineering company. One party’s BATNA is uncertain. This is an excellent negotiation for teaching advanced negotiation skills, including logrolling (trade-offs), compatible issues, contingency contracts, etc. Preparation: 45 min. Negotiation: 60 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: New Recruit by Margaret A. Neale This is a two-party, multi-issue, quantified negotiation over an employment contract. It illustrates pareto-¬optimality and the differences between compatible, trade-off (or integrative), and distributive issues. Preparation: 15 min. Negotiation: 30 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Re¬search Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: [email protected]. EXERCISE: The Performance Interview by Leonard Greenhalgh This two-party simulation involves an interaction between a boss and a subordinate. The simulation evokes participants’ normal styles of dealing with an interpersonal problem: whether to directly or indirectly address the problem, or avoid dealing with it. Preparation: 30 min. Meeting: 30 min. Available from Creative Consensus, Inc., P.O. Box 5054, Hanover, NH 03755. Phone/fax: (603) 643-0331. EXERCISE: Salary Negotiation by Holly Schroth, Gina Ney, Michael Roedter, Adi Rosen, and Michael Tiedman This is a qualitative, two-party salary negotiation that can be used to teach packaging issues, strategic use of compatible issues, and use of objective criteria. Preparation: 10-20 min. Negotiation: 30-40 min. Available from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Phone: (847) 491-8068; e-mail: e-mail: [email protected]. 5. WEB SITE: http://www.leighthompson.com/tips/first_academic_job.htm Leigh Thompson’s Web site contains this section of helpful tips on how to negotiate for your first academic job. Instructor Manual for The mind and heart of the negotiator Leigh L. Thompson 9780132543866, 9781292023199, 9780132827669, 9780135198582